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Abstract: In this paper, we re-examine Mendelson’s model for the equilibrium price of a double-
blind Dutch auction with Poisson-distributed stochastic demand and supply. We present a 
number of new results. We focus on the various ways that demand and supply cross. We identify 
four different categories of crossing, extending Mendelson’s results which are based on a single 
category of crossing. Secondly, conditioning on quantity, we derive the joint distribution of the 
relevant demand and supply prices associated with such two-sided markets originally described 
by Bohm-Bawerk (1891). The distributional result is extended to the case where the limit orders 
on different sides of the market arrive at different rates. Finally, we derive the distributional 
properties of the price elasticities.  
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1. Introduction 
 This paper provides a detailed analysis of an important micro-structure model based on the 
analysis of a double-blind Dutch auction. The (single) Dutch Auction is different from a standard 
auction in that the auction starts with the highest selling price for the asset, then successively 
lowers it until a bidder accepts the price. MacAfee and McMillan (1987) attest that “The Dutch 
Auction is used, for example, for selling cut flowers in the Netherlands, fish in Israel and tobacco 
in Canada.” Double-blind Dutch auctions are where buying and selling prices ascend or descend 
and where prices are constructed without prior knowledge of the other prices. 
 Whilst this structure is not frequently used in financial markets, it has been used as a 
structure for modelling market fragmentation and consolidation, see Mendelson (1987). 
Furthermore, it has wider relevance, the notion used here of market-clearing equilibrium is much 
more in line with how economists think about markets; these  two-sided market models have a 
central role in a great deal of market theory. We can but quote Shapley and Shubik (1971); 
“Two-sided market models are important, as COURNOT, EDGEWORTH, BOHM-BAWERK 
and others have observed, not only for the insights they may give into more general economic 
situations with many types of traders, consumers, and producers, but also for the simple reason 
that in real life many markets and most actual transactions are in fact bilateral--i.e. bring together 
a buyer and a seller of a single commodity.” 
 Our starting point is that both demand and supply are generated by buy and sell orders for 
one unit of commodity; the numbers of which arriving in time up to T are generated by 
independent Poisson processes with a common parameter  λ. The framework follows Mendelson 
(1982). The impact of his assumptions is that these processes become homogeneous spatial 
Poisson processes (see Cressie, 1993) in price space where the analogue of the inter-arrival times 
is the non-negative change in price for supply and minus the non-positive price decrease for 
demand. Equilibrium occurs when the two paths cross. Mendelson solves for the volume 
(quantity) and the prices in equilibrium. 
 There are a number of reasons why we revisit his particular model; firstly the original paper 
provides an accomplished and interesting analysis in its own right. However, it is rather terse and 
difficult to follow in parts; by extending and spelling out in detail some of the technical 
arguments, we hope to make it more accessible. Secondly, market fragmentation has become an 
important topic in recent times and, as mentioned above, one of the few fragmentation models, 
also by Mendelson (1987), builds directly on this structure. Thirdly, there is an expanding 
literature on modelling trading processes, which is also based on Poisson processes. This 
includes research on limit order markets, for an example, see Parlour (1998). This aims to 
capture the nature of contemporary trading venues, whereby traders submit a flow of orders, 
often cancelling some of them immediately. Trading is determined by the stock of live orders, 
the book, plus the arrival of further orders. Here the emphasis is on price discovery and strategic 
equilibrium, rather than market-clearing price equilibrium, as in Mendelson. However, there are 
numerous similarities of approach, which we shall comment on throughout our paper. Fourthly, 
there is an emerging area of financial econometrics based on work by Easley et. al. (2008) , 
which uses Poisson trade arrivals in the modelling of the probability of information-based 
trading (PIN).  
  
 In what follows, we assume, as does Mendelson, that we start with a bid (the highest), then 
we follow with a sell (the lowest) and so on, working our way along the respective curves, until 
the paths cross. In price space, we have what is called an alternating renewal process; these 
processes are widely used in reliability analysis. Where we differ is that we look at different 
ways in which the curves cross. These different crossings lead to different marginal pairs of 
prices which bound the equilibrium price and in turn these different marginal pairs lead to 
different clearing –price ranges. In section 2 we analyse the different crossings. In section 3, we 
present results on the joint distribution of the equilibrium prices in the two cases of equal or 
different arrival rates. Section 4 looks at the distribution of the price elasticities; section 5 
presents some numerical results, and conclusions are presented in section 6. 
 
2. Demand and Supply and Market Clearing 
  
 We consider a Poisson realisation of demand and supply; our interest is the range of possible 
prices where the curves cross. Neither ourselves, nor Mendelson discuss the case where limit 
bids are to the left of limit asks but the curves do not cross; this warrants further analysis. 
Assuming that the number of limit orders is k, which will be the quantity traded, we can envisage 
four prices, corresponding to moving up the supply curve and down the demand curve; 
1sk skP P +<  and . In Figure 1(below), we show the four possible orderings of these 
prices subject to the above constraints. 
1dk dkP P +>
 
  The situation considered by Mendelson is Figure 1; case(a), see Mendelson (1982, Figure 1, 
page 1508). However, the other three cases occur with finite probability and have equal 
economic meaning. 
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                                          Fig. 1 case (a)                                                                      Fig. 1 case (b) 
 
 
 
 
      Fig. 1 case (c)                                                            Fig. 1 case (d) 
 
 Using the properties of the Poisson process, we consider the probabilities that randomly-
generated demand and supply will have market-clearing of these four kinds. We present these 
later but first we need the joint pdf of the four prices. 
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 There is an issue, see Mendelson,(1982, footnote 9)  to do with the treatment of prices which 
are restricted to lie in (0, m) but which are not restricted if we assume inter-arrival times to be 
negative exponential. It is worth thinking about what this might mean in terms of auctioneer 
behaviour. Restricting offers in excess of m seems intuitively reasonable as they add nothing .A 
similar thing could be said for bids that are negative. Precisely how the auctioneer treats these 
will have statistical implications. If she discards them, we are, in effect, truncating the price 
distributions. If she scales them back to be m for offers and puts the bids at zero, we will have 
censoring. Mendelson does not discuss this point explicitly but we will show, by examination of 
one of his results, that at least some of the time, he assumes censoring. This is mentioned in the 
discussion below figure 5, page 1516, where he refers to the probability mass of the execution 
price. We shall first provide, in proposition 1, a calculation for a quantity he refers to as the 
expected value of the market-clearing price range. In the notation below this is E(Y-y). Later 
these variables are referred to as U and L , to help comparison with the original paper,and 
represent upper and lower values for the market-clearing price, more detail is given at the start of 
section 3. 
 Let 1 1, , ,sk dk sk dkx P X P y P Y P+ += = = = .We wish to calculate the joint pdf’ of the four 
variables, conditional that the volume traded is k. We call this  pdf(x, X, y, Y); this can be thought 
of as a truncated density (differing from Mendelson) as any bids in excess of m or asks less than 
0 are ignored and our pdf is re-scaled to integrate to 1. Before we progress to the calculation of 
this pdf, we note that assumptions about censoring or truncation are not innocuous. Proposition 1 
shows the impact of different assumptions on the expected market –clearing price range. 
Proposition 1 
The expected market –clearing price range under censoring is 
( ) (1 exp( 2 )) / 2cE mλ λΔ = − −   
The expected market –clearing price range under truncation is 
( ) (1 exp( 2 ) 2 exp( )) / 2 (1 exp( )).TE m m m mΔ = − − − − − −λ λ λ λ λ  
Furthermore, is always non-negative. ( ) ( )c TE EΔ − Δ
Proof:  Under censoring we note that the result is given by Mendelson, see his theorem 4.1. 
The impact of censoring is that P(L ൑ 0) = P(m < U) = exp(-λm). 
It therefore follows that 
( ) ( ( ) exp( )) / (1 exp( ))
( ) ( ) / (1 exp( ))
T c
T c
E U E U m m m
E L E L m
λ λ
λ
= − − − −
= − −  
( ) ( ( ) ( ) exp( )) / (1 exp( ))T c cE U L E U E L m m mλ λ− = − − − − −
 
The formula follows from substituting in the censoring result and simplifying. 
The inequality can be easily established by noting that the two terms are equal when m = 0 but 
the  censoring term has a larger derivative in m for all positive m. 
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Proposition 2 
 The truncated joint density pdf(x, X, y, Y|k) is given by the following, subject to the necessary 
inequality corresponding to moving along the curves plus the constraint imposed by 
Q = k, Y > X, y < x. 
,X x y Y≤ ≤
  pdf(x, X, y, Y|k) = λ2c2yk-1(m-Y)k-1e-λx e-λ(m-X) 
where c = λk/γ(k, λm) and γ(k, λm) is the incomplete gamma function. 
 Proof:  See Appendix. 
 We could, of course, provide a censored joint pdf as well. This turns out to be very messy as 
can seen by Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3 
 The censored joint density pdf(x, X, y, Y|) is given by the following, subject to the necessary 
inequality corresponding to moving along the curves plus the constraint imposed by 
Q = k, Y > X, y < x. Under censoring we have that 
,X x y Y≤ ≤
pdf(x, y|k) = 
1
1
( , )
k
k xy e
k m
λλ
γ λ
+
− − , 0 < y < x < m 
   = 1
( , )
k
k my e
k m
λλ
γ λ
− − , x = m, 0 < y < m 
and 
pdf(X, Y|k) = 
1
1 (( )
( , )
k
k mm Y e
k m
λλ
γ λ
+
− − −− )X , 0 < X < Y < m 
    = 1( )
( , )
k
k mm Y e
k m
λλ
γ λ
− −− ,   X = 0, 0 < Y < m 
Therefore, the joint pdf(x, X, y, Y|k) is given by the following four expressions: 
pdf(x, X, y, Y|k) = , 0 < y < x < m,  0 < X < Y < m 2 2 1 1 ( )( )k k xc y m Y e eλ λλ − − − −− m X−
    = 2 1 1( )m k k xc e y m Y eλ λλ − − − −− , 0 < y < x < m,  X = 0,  0 < Y < m 
                         = , x = m, 0 < y < m,  0 < X < Y < m 2 1 1 (( )m k k m Xc e y m Y eλλ − − − − −− )λ
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1−                         =  , x = m, 0 < y < m,  X = 0, 0 < Y < m 2 1( )m k kc e y m Yλ− − −
where  
( , )
k
c
k m
λ
γ λ= . 
 
Remark  It is worth noting that our bivariate censored pdf has two components. When we 
consider truncated   pdfs in one dimension, our results simplify as above and we have only one 
component. It seems clear that the censored pdf is much more complex, with no obvious gains in 
realism; this suggests to us, at least, that we should work, where appropriate, with truncated 
distributions. In fact, it seems that Mendelson sometimes does not impose both constraints, for 
example when discussing the distribution of quantities traded. We shall make the same 
assumptions for quantities traded. 
Having computed the truncated density in proposition 2, it is now possible to calculate the 
probabilities of the different crossings; these are given in proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4.    
The probabilities of  state, a, b, c, and d , all conditional upon quantity k, are given by the 
following expressions P(a|k), P(b|k), P(c|k), P(d|k) 
 
1 1 1
0
1 1
( ) ( )
( , 2 1 ; ) 2 ( , 2 1; ) 1
!(2 1)
( | )
1 2 ( , 2 1; )
2 1
j
j
j jm
m
m k
F k k j m F k k m
j k
P a k e
me F k k m
k
∞
=−λ
−λ
⎡ ⎤λ + + λ − + λ +⎢ ⎥+⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= λ⎡ ⎤+ + − + −λ⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
∑
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( 1, 2 3 ; )
!(2 3)( )( | )
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)
F k k j m
j km eP b k
mk e F k k
k
∞
−λ =
−λ
⎡ ⎤λ + + + + λ⎢ ⎥+λ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= λ+ ⎡ ⎤+ + − + −λ⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
∑
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1 1 1 1
0
1 1
( ) ( 1)
( , 2 2 ; ) ( 1, 2 2; )
!(2 2)( )( | )
(2 1) 1 2 ( , 2 1; )
2 1
j
j
m
j j
m
m k
F k k j m F k k m
j km eP c k
mk e F k k m
k
∞
−λ =
−λ
⎡ ⎤λ + + + λ − + + λ⎢ ⎥+λ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= λ+ ⎡ ⎤+ + − + −λ⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
∑
 
   = P(d|k) 
 
 Proof:  See Appendix. The 1 1F  function above is the confluent hypergeometric function, see 
Slater (1960). 
 We recall the expression for Prob(Q = k) derived by Mendelson (1982, equation 3.3,1511).  
As already noted, he makes no censoring or truncating assumptions for this calculation. We shall 
follow his procedure without attempting to adjust it.  
 
2( )( ) exp( ) (1 )
(2 1) 2 1
kmProb Q k m
k k
= = − +Γ + +
λ λλ m  (1) 
 
For k > 0, 
Prob(Q = k) = Prob(Q = k, state = a) + Prob(Q = k, state = b) + Prob(Q = k, state = c) +  
   Prob(Q = k, state = d). 
Furthermore, we can employ Bayes’s rule to infer  
 Prob(state = a|Q = k) = Prob(Q = k, state = a)/Prob(Q = k), 
with corresponding results for the other states.  
We now discuss extensions of our results when the arrival rates of   buy and sell limit orders 
differ; we include this case because of its added realism.We derive  the joint pdf under truncation 
in proposition 5. 
Proposition 5. 
 
 Extending the result stated in Proposition 2 to the case where demand and supply have 
different rates of arrival given by λd and λs respectively, we have the joint truncated conditional            
pdf(x, X, y, Y|k) given by 
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pdf(x, X, y, Y) ן
1
1
( )1( ) exp( ( ))
( , ) ( , )
k
s
k
x m Yks d
d
d s
y e m X
k m k m
−+ −λ −−λ λ ⋅ −λ −γ λ γ λ  
                 for 0 < y < x< m and 0 < X < Y < m 
 
 
To help make comparisons with Mendelson’s results, we present marginal pdfs for the case of 
different arrival rates. Results for his case can be found based on arguments presented on page 
1521. 
Proposition  6. 
 The marginal distributions of  L and U (under censoring) which bound the market- clearing 
price  in case (a), for unequal arrival rates are given by 
 d mlf ( L x ) e ,
−= = λ  when x = 0 
   = 
0
1 1
2 2
d d s
k
m ( )xs d
d
k
( m m )e e ( k ,k
( k )
∞− −
=
⎡ ⋅ + +⎢ +⎣ ∑λ λ λ
λ λλ βΓ ; x / m )  
  + 
1
0
1 2
2 3
d s
k k
( )xs d
s
k
( m ) ( m ) e ( k ;k ; x /
( k )
+∞ −
=
⎤⋅ + + m )⎥+ ⎦∑ λ λ
λ λλ βΓ ,  for 0 < x ൑ m 
 uf (U x )= =
0
1 1
2 2
d d s
k k
m ( )xs d
s
k
( m ) ( m )e e ( k ,
( k )
∞− −
=
⎡ + +⎢ +⎣ ∑λ λ λ
λ λλ βΓ k ; x / m )  
  + 
1
0
2 1
2 3
d s
k k
( )xs d
d
k
( m ) ( m ) e ( k ,k ;( x / m
( k )
+∞ −
=
⎤+ + ))⎥+ ⎦∑ λ λ
λ λλ βΓ ,  for 0 < x ൑ m 
    = , when x = m sme−λ
Where 1
1 1p( p,q;w ) w ( w ) ,
B( p,q )
−= −β 1q−   the Beta pdf with ( p ) ( q )B( p,q ) ( p q )= +
Γ Γ
Γ  
Once we have these two sets of results, we can, in principle, compare the two pdf’s for U and L 
in the four crossing case versus the (a) crossing case. It could well be possible to provide some 
analytic results here; we could easily present some numerical results for our various densities. 
However the issue of censoring versus truncation makes comparisons more complicated. 
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 3. Prices 
 Here we can compute ∆, the clearing price range, where, as previously mentioned, we define 
U and L to be the upper and lower prices of the price equilibrium respectively.  Both prices will 
depend upon the quantity traded, Q, both are clearing prices, as are any of the prices between 
them. In state(a), by inspection of  Figure 1 in Mendelson,(1982), L = skP
dkP
 and U = . Inspecting 
the three other cases in Figure 1 in this paper, we see that the same relationships hold. The point 
to bear in mind is that these are limit orders, thus the buyer will buy at  or any price cheaper 
whilst the seller will sell at 
dkP
skP  or any price higher. The calculations for the clearing price range 
distribution, and the comparisons with Mendelson’s results, are very lengthy and we shall leave 
them for a companion paper. 
The Elasticities of Supply and Demand 
 In this section, we provide some new results on the elasticity of supply and demand. Since 
we are computing elasticities at arbitrary points on the demand and supply curves and we do not 
consider issues of truncation; we use the symbol i for an arbitrary quantity(not necessarily 
traded). Here, we take the quantity, i, as given and the price ip  as random; the (inverse) 
elasticity of supply, sε (with a corresponding definition for the inverse elasticity of demand, dε ) 
will be defined as: 
1
1
( 1)
i
i
s
p
p
i
ε −
Δ
=
−
 
Noting the independence of the price increments whose common distribution is negative 
exponential with parameter , which we denote by (iNE ; for the ith price change, we see 
that the distribution of the elasticity of supply is that of the following ratio; 
1
1
( 1) ( )
( )
i s
i
j s
j
i NE
NE
λ
λ−
=
−
∑
 
From the independence of the elements in the series, we see that the numerator and denominator 
are independent. 
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 The moment-generating function of the numerator (divided by (i-1)) is given by 
1( ) (1 )n s
m t tλ= −  
The moment-generating function of the denominator is given by 
1
1( ) (1 )id s
m t tλ −= −  
On inspection, we see that the distribution of the numerator (divided by i-1) is
2
sλ  times a chi-
squared with 2 degrees of freedom. Likewise, the distribution of the denominator is 
2
sλ  times a 
chi-squared with 2(i-1) degrees of freedom. Putting these together, we see that εs is distributed  
as F(2,2(i-1)). In particular, it does not depend upon λs, a surprising result. This is for the 
distribution of elasticity, conditional upon i; the unconditional result could be calculated, but it 
seems to have little economic content, being a value of elasticity, averaged over quantity  
 Using results for the inverse moments of the chi-squared distribution, we see  
that  E( =1+ 1
( 2)i − , so that inverse elasticity of supply will on average be above 1 whilst 
inverse elasticity of demand will, on average, be below-1. Furthermore, Var(εs) will be O(
1
i
). 
Thus as we  move up the supply curve and back up the demand curve our inverse elasticities 
converge in mean square, and hence probability, to 1 and -1 respectively. Finally, if we wanted 
the distribution of elasticity, rather than inverse elasticity, they are easily recoverable since the 
inverse of F(n, m) is distributed as F(m, n). 
5. Numerical Results 
We present some illustrative results for the parameter λ = .1 and m = 20, and small values of k 
from 1 to 5, see Table 2.We note in passing that 
 E(Q) = (1 exp( 2 )) / 4
2
m m− − −λ λ  
And thus, for this example, E(Q)=.754. 
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Table 2 
 
                1                2                 3                 4                           5 
      
P(Q=k׀a) 
0.6030067156 0.3365814773 0.05569860961 0.004490380057 0.0002157514455
      
P(Q=k׀b) 
0.8646276964 0.1254818855 0.00944194220 0.000434657865 0.0000135093537
      
P(Q=k׀c) 
0.7589533435 0.2155159849 0.02401154626 0.001461167516 0.0000564181404
 
 We can discern from Table 2 that for k = 1, P(Q = k|a) is not the highest conditional but this 
changes as k increases. This can be further illustrated by using Bayes rule as discussed above and 
graphing all four functions in terms of k, i.e., Prob(state|k) see Figure 2, below. 
 
Figure 2(a) 
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 Figure 2(b) 
 
 Figure 2(c) 
 
 
As k tends to infinity, the probability of state a, conditional on k increases whilst the other three 
states all decrease; thus we would expect Mendelson’s model to be highly accurate for large k, 
even in our general case of four states. However, large k, especially relative to small λm, is a low 
probability event. The most pertinent calculation is that of the unconditional probabilities of the 
four states which can be easily calculated from Proposition 2 and equation 1. For the parameters, 
λ =.1 and m = 20, we find that Prob(a) = .122, Prob(b) =.183, Prob(c) = Prob(d) =.144,whilst  
 
12 
 
 13 
 
Prob(Q = 0) =.406. Thus, for this example, which is based on an example used by Mendelson, 
state(a) is the least likely. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 We have demonstrated in this paper that Mendelson’s model of double-blind Dutch auctions 
with Poisson arrivals can be analysed in terms of four different ways in which demand and 
supply curves cross. We have shown that the probabilities of the three “new” states are non-
negligible. Indeed, for the example when λ =.1 and m = 20 we might expect, on average, 2 buy 
and 2 sell orders per day (unit time). For this case, state (a) is the event least likely relative to the 
other three states or the probability of no trade. For the second case considered by Mendelsohn, 
where  λ= 1 and m= 20, Prob (Q=0) is approximately 0, and all four states are approximately 
equally likely.  
  Furthermore analysis will depend upon the assumptions we make as to how the auctioneer 
treats extremely large limit order offers and extremely small limit order bids .We argue for a 
truncation approach rather than a censoring one favoured by Mendelson. This leads to 
considerable simplifications in the joint distribution of prices. We also demonstrate numerically 
that as volume traded increases the Mendelson state becomes the most likely but the probability 
of high volume in the context of Poisson demand and supply is likely to be very small. These 
findings will have an impact on market-clearing prices which we leave for a subsequent paper. 
Finally we derive the distribution of demand and supply price elasticity and show that,  
conditional on quantity, they follow F distributions.
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition  2 
Since x = Psk+1, y = Psk, X = Pdk+1, Y = Pdk and these prices are the occurrence time of our 
respective spatial Poisson processes we have: 
 x = y + sk+1 and X = Y – dk+1 
with sk+1 an  dk+1 iid EX(λ). Therefore d
 pdf(x|y)α λ exp(-λ(x - y)),   y < x < m 
and 
 pdf(y) = 1 ,
( , )
k
ky e
k m
− −λλ
γ λ
y  0 < y < m 
where 
 , 1
0
( , )
z n wn z w e dw− −γ = ∫
the incomplete Gamma function. Consequently, 
 pdf(x,y) = pdf(x|y)pdf(y) 
   
1
1 ,
( , )
k
k xy e
k m
+
− −λλα γ λ   0 < y < x < m 
For demand we have 
 Y = Pdk = m – Σ dj 
resulting in 
 X = Pdk+1 = Y – dk+1. 
Consequently, 
 pdf(X|Y) α λ exp(-λ(Y – X)) 
and 
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 1( ) ( ) exp( ( )
( , )
k
k ),pdf Y m y m y
k m
−λ= − −λγ λ −    0 < y < m 
Thus 
 
1
1( , ) ( ) exp( ( ))
( , )
k
kpdf X Y m y m X
k m
+
−λα − −λγ λ −  
and since demand and supply are independent we have 
2( 1)
1 1
2( , , , ) ( ) exp( ( ))( , )
k
k x kpdf x X y Y y e m y m X
k m
+
− −λ −λα − −γ λ λ −  , 0< y <  x < m, 0 < X < Y < m 
  
Proof of Proposition 3  
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 2 we have 
  x = y + sk+1 
giving 
  pdf(x|y) = λ exp(-λ(x – y)), y < x < m 
and 
  pdf(x = m|y) = exp( ( ))
m
x y dx
∞λ −λ −∫  
   = exp(-λ(m – y)), 0 < y < m 
Thus 
  pdf(x|y) = λ exp(-λ(x – y)), 0 < y < x < m 
   = exp(-λ(m – y)), x = m, 0 < y < m 
and since 
  pdf(y, y < m) = 1 ,
( , )
k
k yy e
k m
− −λλ
γ λ  0 < y < m 
we have 
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  pdf(x, y)  =  pdf(x|y)pdf(y) 
   = 
1
1 ,
( , )
k
k xy e
k m
+
− −λλ
γ λ  0 < y < x < m 
   = 1 ,
( , )
k
k my e
k m
− −λλ
γ λ  x = m, 0 < y < m 
Similarly, since 
  X = Y – dk+1 
we have 
  pdf(X|Y) = λ exp(-λ(Y – X)), 0 < X < Y < m 
  pdf(X = 0|Y) =  exp( ) exp( )
Y
w dx Y
∞λ −λ = −λ∫
Thus 
  pdf(X|Y) = λ exp(-λ(Y – X)), 0 < X < Y < m 
   =  exp(-λY), X = 0, 0 < Y < m 
and since 
  pdf(Y, Y < m) =  
( , )
k
k m
λ
γ λ (m – y)
k-1e-λ(m-Y) 
we have 
  pdf(X, Y)  = 
1
( , )
k
k m
+λ
γ λ (m – y)
k-1 exp(-λ(m – X)), 0 < X < Y < m 
   = 
( , )
k
k m
λ
γ λ e
-λm(m – Y)k-1, X = 0, 0 < Y < m 
Finally 
 pdf(x, X, y, Y) = pdf(x,y) · pdf(X,Y) 
giving the four expressions stated in the theorems. 
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Proof of Proposition 4  
The various probabilities are readily found by straightforward but tedious integration of the joint 
pdf(x, X, y, Y) as specified in Proposition 2 and subject to the particular ordering of X, X, y, Y for 
the respective crossing. Thus 
  P(a|k) = 
0 0 0 0
( , , , )
m x Y y
pdf x X y Y dXdydYdx∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  
  P(b|k) = 
0 0 0 0
( , , , )
m Y x X
pdf x X y Y dydXdxdY∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  
  P(c|k) = 
0 0 0 0
( , , , )
m x Y X
pdf x X y Y dydXdYdx∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  
   = P(d|k) 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
We proceed as in the proof of Proposition 2 except we now allow sk+1 and dk+1 to be distributed, 
respectively, as X(λs) and EX(λd). Thus E
  pdf(x|y) ן λs  ( )s x ye−λ − , y < x < m 
with 
  pdf(y) = 1
( , )
s
k
yks
s
y e
k m
−λ−λ
γ λ  0 < y < m 
Thus 
  pdf(x,y) ן
1
1
( , )
s
k
xks
s
y e
k m
+
−λ−λ
γ λ  0 < y < x < m 
and 
  pdf(X,Y) ן
1
1( ) exp( ( ))
( , )
k
kd
d
d
m y m X
k m
+
−λ − −λ −γ λ  0 < X < Y < m 
giving 
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  pdf(x, X, y, Y) ן
1
1
( )1( ) exp( ( ))
( , ) ( , )
k
s
k
x m Yks d
d
d s
y e m X
k m k m
−+ −λ −−λ λ ⋅ −λ −γ λ γ λ  
     0 < y < x< m and 0 < X < Y < m 
Proof of Proposition 6 
From Figure 1 in Mendelson (1982) it is clear that 
   and D(m – x) = j,  j ൒ k + 1 L x S( x ) k> ⇔ =
Consequently 
  D(m – x) = j) 
0 1k j k
P( L x ) P( S( x ) k ,
∞ ∞
= = +
> = =∑ ∑
  =  
0 1k j k
P( S( x ) k ) P( D( m x ) j )
∞ ∞
= = +
= −∑ ∑ =
  = 
0 1
d d s
k j
m ( )x s d
k j k
( x ) ( ( m x ))e
k ! j !
λ λ λ λ λ∞ ∞− + −
= = +
−∑ ∑  
Letting 
  a = λs x 
  b = λd m- (λd - λs) x 
 with (b – a) = λd (m- x) 
we have 
 
0 1
k j
b
k j k
a ( b aP( L x ) e
k ! j !
∞ ∞−
= = +
−> = ∑ ∑ )  
Now 
 
1 0
j jk
b a
j k j
( b a ) ( b a )e
j ! j !
∞ −
= + =
− −= −∑ ∑  
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   = 
0
1
jk
b a ( b a )
j
( b a )e ( e
j !
− − −
=
−− ∑ )  
Thus 
 
0 0
1
k jk
b
k j
a ( b a )P( L x ) e
k ! j !
∞−
= =
−> = − ∑ ∑  
Giving 
 
0 0
k jk
b
k j
a ( b a )P( L x ) e
k ! j !
∞−
= =
−≤ = ∑ ∑  
And we notice immediately that 
  0 d mP( L ) e λ−=≤
and P(L ൑ m) = 1 
and further, since 0 ൑ L ൑ m we have a point mass at x = 0 of  d me .λ−
The pdf, fl(x) is readily found via differentiation 
i.e., lf ( x ) P( L x )x
∂= ≤∂  
and since 
 s d s
a b, ( )
x x
λ λ λ∂ ∂= = − −∂ ∂  and d
( b a )
x
λ∂ − = −∂  
We have, after some simplification 
 
1
0 0 1
k k k k
b b
l d s
k k
a ( b a ) a ( b a )f ( x ) e e
k ! k ! k !( k )!
λ λ
+∞ ∞− −
= =
− −= + +∑ ∑  
Recalling the definitions of a and b we note 
 
2
1 1
1 1 2 2
k k kk k
s d ma ( b a ) ( k ,k ; x / m )
( k ) ( k ) ( k )
λ λ βΓ Γ Γ
− = ⋅ + ++ + +  
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where  β(p,q;z) = 11 1pz ( z )
B( p,q )
1q ,− −⋅ −  the Beta pdf 
 with B(p,q) = ( p ) ( q )
( p q )
Γ Γ
Γ +  
Using a similar approach for the second sum we get the expression for fl(x) given in the theorem.  
For the distribution of U we now note that 
  and D(m – x) = k,  j ൒ k + 1 U x S( x ) j≤ ⇔ =
Thus 
   D(m – x) = k) 
0 1k j k
P(U x ) P( S( x ) j,
∞ ∞
= = +
< = =∑ ∑
and with the same definitions of a and b we have 
 
0 0
1
k jk
b
k j
( b a ) aP(U x ) e
k ! j !
∞−
= =
−< = − ∑ ∑  
giving 
 P(U < 0) = 0 
smλ− . eand P(U < m) = 1 - 
Further, since P(U ൑ m) = 1 we have a point mass at x = m of sme λ− . 
Again we have 
 uf ( x ) P(U x )x
∂= <∂  
  = 
1
0 0 1
k k k k
b b
s d
k k
( b a ) a ( b a ) ae e
k ! k ! k !( k )!
λ λ
+∞ ∞− −
= =
− −+ +∑ ∑  
which upon substitution for a and b we get the expression for fu(x) given in the theorem. 
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